NOTES
ALL STUDENTS ARE NOT CREATED
EQUAL: THE INEQUITABLE COMBINATION
OF PROPERTY-TAX-BASED SCHOOL
FINANCE SYSTEMS AND LOCAL CONTROL
ERIN E. KELLY
INTRODUCTION

"The nation is hardly 'indivisible' where education is concerned.
It is at least two nations, quite methodically divided, with...
liberty for some... and justice ... only for the kids whose
parents can afford to purchase it."'

Although every state constitution has an education clause that
requires legislatures to educate their children, 2 most states have
adopted school finance schemes that disregard the rights of poor
children who desperately need educational benefits. By relying

principally on property taxes to generate money for education,3
the majority of school funding schemes impermissibly

create

wealth-based disparities in educational opportunities. Wealthy
school districts raise a large amount of revenue from low tax rates,

whereas poor school districts levy a much higher tax rate but
generate less revenue.4 Thus, these school finance schemes enable
wealthy students to attain educational luxuries while poor districts

lack basic necessities.5 The inadequate education that poor stu1.

JONATHAN KozoL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS

212 (1991).
2. William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35 B.C.
L. REV. 569, 572-73 (1994).
3. Most states generate a substantial portion of their educational budgets from local
property taxes. See William E. Thro, The Significance of the Tennessee School Finance
Decision, 85 EDuC. L. REP. 11, 11 n.2 (1993).
4. Ron Renchler, Financial Equity in the Schools, ERIC DIGEST, Dec. 1992, at 1. In
some states, the unequal ability among districts to raise revenue for schools varies by a
factor as high as ten to one. ALLAN ODDEN, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CHANGING
CONTOURS OF SCHOOL FINANCE 3 (1991). In this Note, "wealthy" refers to districts with
a high socioeconomic status and "poor" refers to school districts with a low socioeconomicstatus.
5. Thro, supra note 3, at 13. See generally KOzOL, supra note 1 (describing the
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dents receive perpetuates and exacerbates their disadvantaged status.
State legislatures, recognizing the blatant injustice of propertytax educational funding, have made a token attempt to alleviate
some of the spending disparities by guaranteeing districts a minimum amount of state aid per pupil.6 The guaranteed minimums,
however, do not adequately educate poor students. Property-tax
systems also fail to alleviate fiscal inequality because wealthy districts can raise funds above the guaranteed minimums.7 The edu-

cational disparities that these school finance systems create have
prompted legal challenges against the schemes on both federal and
state constitutional grounds.8
Legislatures have responded to successful constitutional challenges by providing additional revenue to poor schools. Through
increased funding, legislatures have attempted both to reduce
spending variations among districts and to enrich the educational
programs of poor schools. However, the revised furiding formulas
still fail to eliminate expenditure disparities. Moreover, although
each of the revised funding schemes gives poor schools additional
aid, not all of the systems have the same potential to substantively
improve poor districts' educational programs. The local impact of
school finance reform in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Tennessee, and Texas illustrates that the most effective reform
measures are not limited to merely an increase in funding to poor

bleak conditions in underfunded schools).
6. Renchler, supra note 4, at 1. The three basic types of equalization programs are
flat grants, foundation aid, and percentage equalizing. Thro, supra note 3, at 13 n.19;
NATIONAL EDUC. ASS'N, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., UNDERSTANDING STATE SCHOOL FINANCE FORMULAS 9-11 (1987). Flat grants provide a district with an equal number of
dollars per student and faculty member. Id. at 9. Under a foundation program, the state
sets a foundation amount, which is the minimum amount of money that will adequately
educate each pupil. The state requires local school districts to tax at a minimum rate.
The state pays the district foundation aid, which is the difference between the amount of
money per student that the district raises through the mandated tax rate and the foundation amount. Id. at 9-10. In a percentage equalizing system, the state reimburses a proportion of local educational expenditures in inverse proportion to a district's wealth. The
state calculates an aid ratio by combining wealth per pupil and the nominal state percentage of expenditures. The state applies the aid ratio to each district to determine the
amount of the state contribution. Id. at 10-11. The majority of states, before and after
reform, have distributed aid pursuant to foundation programs. Id. at 16.
7. Renchler, supra note 4, at 1.
8. Plaintiffs in 45 states have challenged the state constitutionality of school funding
schemes. See Joshua S. Wyner, Toward a Common Law Theory of Minimal Adequacy in
Public Education, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 389, 397-98 (1994).
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schools. States' revised funding systems also must encourage poor
districts to improve and expand upon their core curricula and
implement accountability mechanisms.
Part I of this Note describes the federal and state constitutional challenges that plaintiffs have advanced against state school
funding schemes. Part II then discusses the state supreme court
decisions in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Tennessee, and
Texas that invalidated school funding systems relying principally on
local property taxes to fund education. This Part also examines the
legislatures' responses to these decisions and the local effects of
their revised formulas. Although the new funding plans can provide poor schools with additional revenue, the revised schemes still
fail to give poor districts equal access to state aid. This Note concludes that in order to effectively improve the quality of education
in poor districts, school finance systems must include incentives for
poor districts to expand and enrich upon their core curricula and
must contain accountability mechanisms.
I. BASES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO PROPERTY-TAX
SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEMS

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, plaintiffs challenged funding
disparities primarily under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.9 Plaintiffs contended that because education is a
fundamental right, the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed students
equality of educational funding. States allegedly violated the Fourteenth Amendment because they failed to ensure that poor schools
were as adequately funded as those in wealthy districts.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,"°
the United States Supreme Court foreclosed the use of the Equal
Protection Clause to challenge funding disparities. The Rodriguez
plaintiffs contended that because Texas relied on property taxes to
fund education, the system unconstitutionally created wealth-based
disparities in educational opportunities and denied poor students
their fundamental right to an education." However, the Rodriguez Court held that wealth was not a suspect classification and
that education was not a fundamental right. 2 Wealth was not a
9. Thro, supra note 3, at 14; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. 411 U.S. 1 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
11. Id. at 16-17.
12. Id. at 18.
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suspect classification because the Court found no basis for believing that poor students lived only in school districts with low property values. 3 The Court further held that there was
no ...

interference with fundamental rights where only relative

differences in spending levels are involved and where.., no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each
child with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills
necessary for the enjoyment of the rights of speech and of full
participation in the political process. 4

The Court therefore applied a rational basis test to the Texas finance system and ruled that the state's reliance on property taxes
was a rational and constitutional means of promoting local control
over schools.'5
Although Rodriguez denies plaintiffs a federal constitutional
claim, the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v.
&' demonstrates that plaintiffs can successfully attack disCahill
criminatory funding schemes on the state level. The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that New Jersey's finance scheme violated the
state constitution's education clause because the system's reliance
on property taxes to fund education created educational disparities.'7 Since Robinson, other state high courts have struck down
funding schemes on either state equal protection or education
clause grounds."
State equal protection claims parallel those made pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Plaintiffs bringing

13.
14.
15.
16.
(1973),
17.
18.

Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 37 (quoted in Wyner, supra note 8, at 393).
Id. at 44, 54-55.
303 A.2d 273 (NJ.), affd, 306 A.2d 65 (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976
affd on reh'g, 351 A.2d 713, 724 (NJ.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295.
Eleven state supreme courts have invalidated inequitable funding schemes on

state equal protection and/or education clause grounds. See DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist.
No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark. 1983); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn.
1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy
v. Secretary of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E2d 516, 553-54 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989), amended, 784 P.2d
412, 413-14 (Mont. 1990); Robinson, 303 A.2d at 295; Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 156 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391, 398 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 104 (Wash.
1978) (en bane); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878, 884 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hershier, 606 P.2d 310, 333-34 (Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 824 (1980).
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state constitutional challenges contend that education is a fundamental right that the state impermissibly infringes by maintaining a
funding scheme that allocates educational benefits according to
wealth. To prevail under this rationale, plaintiffs must demonstrate
that education is a fundamental right and that wealth is a suspect
classification or, in the alternative, that the state's funding scheme
is irrational. 9
Challenges based on a state's equal protection clause rarely
succeed, largely because many state high courts have followed the
Rodriguez holding that education is not a fundamental right and
wealth is not a suspect class. Although state courts can give broader protection to individual rights than the Constitution provides,
courts have infrequently done so in school funding cases. Of twenty-three state equal protection clause challenges, only six have
prevailed.?°
Plaintiffs have had more recent success, however, with state
education clause challenges. Every state constitution has an education clause that imposes a duty on legislatures to provide each
child with a public education.2' Since 1989, the high courts of
Montana, Kentucky, Texas, and Massachusetts have invalidated
property-tax funding schemes on education clause grounds In
addition to emphasizing spending inequity, education clause challenges focus on the disparate quality of education that students in
poor districts receive. High courts thus appropriately invalidate
property-tax funding systems because these schemes provide dis-

19. Thro, supra note 3, at 15.
20. The six prevailing state equal protection clause challenges are DuPree v. Alma
Sch. Dist. No 30., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976),
cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Pauley v. Kelly, 255
S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
21.. Sparkman, supra note 2, at 573.
22. Thro, supra note 3, at 19; see also Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d
516 (Mass. 1993); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont.
1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch.
Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). The Tennessee Supreme
Court held that the education clause mandates a minimum level of education, but ultimately found that the school finance system was unconstitutional under the state equal
protection clause because the property-tax scheme was irrational. Tennessee Small Sch.
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152, 156 (Tenn. 1993); Thro, supra note 3, at 22.
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tricts with unequal revenues and do not give poor districts a constitutionally mandated level of quality.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE INVALIDATION
OF PROPERTY-TAX FUNDING SCHEMES AND THE
LOCAL EFFECTS OF REVISED SYSTEMS

State high courts that invalidated property-tax finance systems
properly held that expenditure disparities create wealth-based
differences in educational opportunities. The legislative responses
to these decisions have given poor districts more revenue in order
to reduce spending variations and enrich the educational programs
of poor districts. Some of the modified funding formulas, however,
do not ensure that substantive change will occur because they do
not induce curriculum improvement.
A study of local school districts' expenditures shows that although many factors influence the effectiveness of a school funding
system, there are some general ways of assessing the local ramifications of revised schemes. The first factor is the equity of the
modified school finance systems, which can be measured through
three components: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and fiscal
neutrality.' The degree of a formula's horizontal equity can be
observed by comparing the per pupil expenditures of the wealthiest and poorest districts. Even though absolute equality of expenditures is not possible, these new systems must substantially narrow revenue gaps to eliminate wealth-based allocations of benefits.
A scheme with vertical equity takes into account the different
costs associated with educating particular kinds of students, such as
bilingual, special education, or gifted pupils. Finally, fiscal neutrality requires similar tax efforts and burdens among districts.24
The second factor is whether legislative reforms encourage
poor districts to improve and expand upon their core educational
curricula.' For example, new finance schemes that have separate

23. LAWRENCE 0. Picus & LINDA HERTERT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., A SCHOOL
FINANCE DILEMMA FOR TEXAS: ACHIEVING EQurrY IN A TIME OF FISCAL CONSTRAINT
3 (Working Paper No. 33, Jan. 1993).
24. NATIONAL EDUC. ASS'N, supra note 6, at 5.
25. Some reform opponents have argued that school aid has overwhelmingly flowed
to teacher and administrative salaries rather than to new educational services for students.
See, eg., D.P. Moynihan, Equalizing Education: In Whose Benefit?, 29 THE PUB. INTEREST 69, 74-75 (1972). However, salary increases have value because they could improve
employees' morale and encourage more qualified teachers to seek employment in low in-
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capital-outlay and maintenance-aid components can save poor
districts from investing all of their new money in crumbling buildings instead of in new educational programs. Formulas that ensure
funding stability also can prompt districts to adopt new, innovative
programs. Moreover, state prerequisites to aid, such as outcomebased assessment or long-range planning, promote curriculum
expansion.
The third factor is whether the revised school finance schemes
have accountability mechanisms, such as standardized testing and
oversight committees, to ensure that districts use money effectively.
Accountability mechanisms can encourage a district to bolster its
curriculum in tested subject areas. In addition, they can help a
district to identify areas of mismanagement and to understand how
additional aid impacts student performance.
Courts' methods of invalidating funding schemes, whether on
the basis of state equal protection or education clause grounds,
have not appeared to influence the legislative responses to the
invalidation of funding schemes. All of the new legislative schemes
attempt to give poor districts more money. Although these new
systems increase the amount of state aid available to poor districts,
an examination of the schemes' horizontal equity, vertical equity,
and fiscal neutrality reveals that they do not all significantly narrow the revenue gap between poor and wealthy districts. Despite
the modification of the formulas, wealthy districts still can raise
more revenue than the state provides to poor districts.
State legislatures undoubtedly intend for poor districts to use
increases in state funding to improve their educational programs.
However, a study of the local effects of revised funding formulas
in Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Texas
shows that states cannot give local districts total discretion as to
how to use new aid. Rather, revised schemes must condition new
funding on substantive educational improvements to rectify the
educational inadequacies in historically poor districts.
A. Kentucky
When invalidating Kentucky's school finance plan, the Kentucky Supreme Court focused on the degree of fiscal inequity

come districts. Michael W. Kirst, What Happens at the Local Level After School Finance
Reform?, 3 POL'Y ANALYSIS 301, 303 n.4 (1977).
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among districts and on the inferior quality of education that poor
districts received. In Rose v. Council for Better Education Inc.,26
the Kentucky Supreme Court declared that not only the state's
funding formula, but the entire school system violated the education clause of the Kentucky Constitution. The court held that the
legislature had not fulfilled the education clause's mandate of
providing an "efficient system of common schools" throughout the
state.27
At the time Rose was decided, the state contributed funds for
education under a Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) and a
Percentage Equalizing Program (PEP). To receive MFP funding,
districts needed to levy a minimum property tax rate.2 Each district also had to operate its schools and pay its teachers for 185
days per year.29 If districts qualified for MFP funds, the state
would give districts a grant based on the district's average daily
student attendance in each grade.' The PEP element of the formula attempted to minimize disparities in wealthy and poor
districts' educational expenditures.31 After determining the maximum tax rate that its PEP fund could match, the state gave poor
districts the difference between what ihe PEP rate would produce
and the amount of money that the district actually generated. 2
The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the PEP rate was too
low to minimize disparities.33
The court correctly found that Kentucky's system offered its
poor students few educational opportunities.' 4 On the national
level, 80% of Kentucky's school districts were "poor" in terms of
taxable property, and the other 20% were below the national average.' The poor districts had fewer course offerings, lower
achievement test scores, and higher student-teacher ratios than
wealthy districts.' Thus, the court correctly reasoned that the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
Id

31.

Id

32.
33.
at 196
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. The PEP rate was a mere 13 cents for every $100 of property valuation. Id.
n.10.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 197.
Id
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scheme did not provide students with an "efficient" educational

system. Unlike most other high courts, the Kentucky court enumerated the characteristics that would fulfill the constitutionally

mandated standard of an "efficient" school system,37 but emphasized that the General Assembly had to decide how to achieve a
constitutional education plan.3"
Within eleven months of Rose, the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990
(KERA).39 KERA has three elements of reform: finance, curriculum, and governance.' KERA's finance reform component consists of a base funding level, Tier I, and Tier II.' The base funding level is a per pupil sum adjusted by several factors that influence educational costs. 42 The new system requires districts to
raise a minimum Equivalent Tax Rate (ETR) of 30 cents per $100
of assessed property value43 before districts can receive aid.

The

37. The characteristics include whether the school system is 1) free to all; 2) provides equal educational opportunities for all students; 3) state controlled and administered; 4) "substantially uniform"; and 5) equal to and for all students. Id. at 212. An
efficient system must aim to provide students with the following seven capabilities: 1)
"oral and written communication skills" that enable them to function in a complex and
changing society; 2) "knowledge of economic, social, and political systems" that will permit them to make informed choices; 3) understanding of the governmental process; 4)
knowledge of "mental and physical wellness"; 5) knowledge of the arts; 6) sufficient
training in vocational or educational fields to enable students to choose and pursue life
work; and 7) a level of educational or vocational skills that will allow students to compete favorably with students in other states, academia, and in the job market. Id. The
obligation to maintain an efficient system cannot be shifted to local districts. Id.
38. Id.
39. Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990, ch. 476, 1990 Ky. Acts 1208 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 156.005-446.260 (Baldwin
1995)).
40. Jacob E. Adams, Jr., Spending School Reform Dollars in Kentucky: Familiar Patterns and New Programs, But Is This Reform?, 16 EDUc. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 375, 377 (Winter 1994).
41. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 157330-.440 (Baldwin 1995).
42. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 157.320(2), 157.360 (Baldwin 1995). The state adjusts
the base funding level for inflation. BErrY E. STEFFY, THE KENTUCKY EDUCATION
REFORM 289 (1993). The additional cost factors are for exceptional children, transportation, and at-risk students. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.360(2) (Baldwin 1995). The average base contribution, including the additional cost factors, was $3,084 per pupil in
1992-1993. KENTUCKY OFFICE OF EDUCATION ACCOUNTABILITY, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT
41 (1993) [hereinafter KY OFFICE OF ACCOUNTABILITY].
43. KY OFFICE OF ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 42, at 27; see also KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 160.470(12)(a) (Baldwin 1995). KERA also provides that all real property subject
to taxation must be assessed at 100% of fair cash value. MIKE D. RICHARDSON ET AL,
U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AN ANALYSIS OF KERA: KENTUCKY'S ANSWER TO EDUCATION-

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:397

state's contribution to the district is the difference between the
amount of revenue the district raises through the ETR and the
base funding level.'
The Tier I element of the revised system enables districts to
tax at a rate that generates additional revenue of up to 15% of
the base funding level. 45 Tier I funds equalize the tax increase at
150% of the statewide average. 46 Tier II sets a tax ceiling at a
levy that will raise up to 30% of the base funding level and Tier I
funds.47 Tier II funds are not equalized by the state.' No district, however, is required to tax at a rate lower than the one
levied before KERA reform in 1989-90."9 Thus, the districts that
raised revenue above the Tier II cap in 1989-90 can continue to
do so.
Despite the fact that some of the wealthiest districts appear to
be exempt from KERA's revenue cap, the revised scheme has
reduced expenditure disparities. The Tier II revenue cap lowered
expenditure disparities between the average of the highest and the
lowest wealth districts from 35.87% to 16.72%."o However, because the wealthiest districts are exempt from the cap, the new
system cannot narrow the gap at the ends of the expenditure spectrum. Although the scheme has a vertical equity component because it gives districts extra aid for educating special students, the
amounts of the additional allotments are arbitrary. The legislature
has not shown that the allotments accurately reflect the costs of
educating special students.
Moreover, poor districts' immediate revenue increases may be
short-lived because the new formula still impermissibly conditions
revenue on a district's ability to tax. Poor districts can only "catch
up" to wealthy ones by levying additional taxes to receive Tier I
and Tier II aid. Tier I does not consider poor districts' unequal
ability to generate revenue because it only equalizes up to 15% of

AL EQUITY 5 (1991). If a district fails to provide the minimum level of support, school
board members may be removed from office. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.470(12)(b)
(Baldwin 1995).
44. KY OFFICE OF AccouNTABmrrY, supra note 42, at 28.
45. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 157.440(1)(a) (Baldwin 1995).

46. Id.
47. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.440(2) (Baldwin 1995).
48. Id.; KY OFFIcE OF ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 42, at 29.
49. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.440(1)(d) (Baldwin 1995); KY OFFICE OF ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 42, at 29-30.
50. KY OFFICE OF AccouNTABmrry, supra note 42, at 39.
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the base funding level regardless of wealth.5 ' Moreover, the Tier

II 30% cap generally directly affects only wealthy districts and is
not equalized by the state.5' Because Kentucky's finance scheme
conditions educational aid on a district's wealth, the new system
continues to deny poor districts an equal access to revenue.
Notwithstanding the new system's fiscal pitfalls, the broadbased focus of KERA's reform has encouraged districts to invest
their new funding in curriculum enrichment. KERA established the

Facilities Support Program of Kentucky (FSPK), which gives dis53
tricts additional aid to improve all of their educational facilities.
In addition, KERA compels districts to spend money on new programs that have a long-term impact on educational progress, such
as early childhood education,

professional development, 55 and

family resources and youth services.5 6 Under these mandates, districts must establish curriculum frameworks, nongraded primary
classes, and new teaching and learning goals. To implement these
objectives, KERA has provided $17 per pupil for staff development.Y

A study of local level expenditures for two high and low
wealth Kentucky school districts shows that these KERA mandates

created the desired curriculum expansion. The poor districts invest-

ed in additional personnel, instruction, facilities, and programs.5 8
Even though all four districts increased spending on staff development, most of the funding went toward .programming instead of
salary increases.59 For example, District 3 instituted a pre-school

51. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.440(1)(a) (Baldwin 1995).
52. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.440(2) (Baldwin 1995).
53. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.440(1)(b) (Baldwin 1995). Like the Tier I component, the FSPK provides that if school districts levy an additional tax of 5 cents over the
ETR rate, the state will equalize the tax at 150% of the average per pupil property
wealth. KY OFFICE OF ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 42, at 46. During 1992-1993, Kentucky appropriated $13.5 million df FSPK funds under a pro rata formula. Id.
54. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 157.317 (Baldwin 1995).
55. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 156.095 (Baldwin 1995).
56. KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 156.497 (Baldwin 1995).
57. Adams, supra note 40, at 384.
58. District 1 is a high wealth suburban district located in the northern region of the
state with a per pupil expenditure of $3,183. Id at 378. District 2 is a high wealth urban
district located in the central part of Kentucky with a per pupil expenditure of $4,388.
Id District 3 is a low wealth rural district with a per pupil expenditure of $2,685 and is
located in the western part of the state. d District 4 is also a low wealth rural district,
has a per pupil expenditure of $2,708, and is in the eastern part of Kentucky. lIL
59. lId at 383-84.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:397

for at-risk children. District 4 started summer school and afterschool tutoring programs.'
In addition, the creation of the FSPK channeled aid into instructional materials and technology. Districts operated additional
afterschool buses, purchased computer equipment, and constructed
new facilities.6' The current formula, however, may discourage
long-term investments in programs and facilities because KERA
does not guarantee districts funding stability. The legislature, at its
discretion, can lower a district's aid allocation from that of the
prior year.
However, KERA appropriately includes two accountability
mechanisms that encourage substantive change. First, KERA requires statewide curriculum assessment.62 Schools must achieve
threshold standardized test scores on an annual basis and will
receive cash awards if, on a biennial average, they score 1% over
the threshold.63 If schools score below the threshold, they are
subject to sanctions that include the creation of a school improvement plan, probation of staff, or student transfer.' This
method of accountability is effective because, although standardized test scores may not define precisely what a student learns,
comparing scores with other districts can both help poor districts
to identify problem areas and prompt districts to bolster curricula
in the tested subject areas. In addition, Kentucky monitors districts
through superintendent screening committees, a task force on high
school restructuring, an early childhood advisory council, and a
higher education review commission.65
To fulfill the constitutional mandate set forth in Rose, the
Kentucky legislature created an entirely new educational system.
In addition to state aid calculation changes, KERA provides for
substantial educational reform.6 These changes properly shift
control away from local school boards and give the state legislature more oversight of districts' educational programs. One might

60. I& at 385-86.
61. Id. at 385.
62. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.6453 (Baldwin 1995). For a detailed discussion of
assessment procedures, see STEFFY, supra note 42, at 47-74.
63.

KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 158.6455(1) (Baldwin 1995); KY OFFiCE OF ACCouNT-

ABILITY, supra note 42, at 78.
64. KY OFFICE OF ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 42, at 78-79.
65. Id. at 217, 291, 294, 296.

66. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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argue that Kentucky's increase of state legislative oversight will
prompt an inefficient use of funds because local school boards
have a greater knowledge of their schools' needs. However, the
Rose court,67 like other courts that have invalidated funding
schemes, emphasized that the state constitution gives the legislature the responsibility of maintaining a constitutional educational
system. Legislative oversight is thus a prerequisite to a permissible
finance system. The Kentucky legislature would be remiss in fulfilling its obligation if it gave local districts a free rein on how to
spend education funds, especially in light of the Rose court's mandate that the new finance scheme must provide each student with
seven specific capabilities.6 Moreover, state control and accountability is necessary for taxpayer support of additional aid.
Furthermore, state officials who defend constitutional challenges to property-tax funding systems on the ground that local control
promotes efficiency ironically fail to recognize that they have consistently instituted policies that undermine local discretion.7" For
example, state guidelines establish uniform curriculum requirements for every public school.7 ' States also certify teachers on a
statewide basis, and some states even standardize the use of textbooks.72 In addition, student testing has been nationalized and
failing districts are generally subject to state takeovers. 73 Therefore, "[t]he liberty of local districts ... is willingly infringed on
grounds of inefficiency. It is only when equal funding is the issue
that the sanctity of district borders becomes absolute."'74 To ensure that additional revenue makes substantive improvements in
poor school districts, state legislatures must continue to oversee
educational programming.

67. 790 S.W.2d 186, 215-16 (Ky. 1989).
68. See supra note 37.
69. For example, the lack of an accountability component in California's system
prompted voters to pass Proposition 98, which mandates school accountability report
cards. LAWRENCE 0.

PiCus, U.S.

DEP'T OF EDUC.,

AN

UPDATE ON

CALIFORNIA

SCHOOL FINANCE 1992-1993: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? 4-5 (1992). School report cards have made voters more receptive to reform. KRISTEN J. AMUNDSON & CRAIG
RICHARDSON, NAT'L SCHOOL BDS. ASSOC., STRAIGHT A's: ACCOUNTABILITY,

MENT,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

ACHIEVEMENT 16 (1991).
KOZOL, supra note 1, at 211.
Id.
Md
IdL
Id.

ASSESS-
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B. Massachusetts
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, like Kentucky's Rose
court, invalidated its education funding scheme on education clause
grounds. In McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education,7 5 the court held that the Commonwealth has a constitutional
obligation to "cherish... the public schools" 76 by providing all
students with an education The Massachusetts legislature failed
to fulfill that duty by implementing a finance scheme that offered
students in poor school districts fewer educational opportunities
than children in wealthy districts had.78
Like many other states' systems, the unconstitutional Massachusetts system primarily relied on local property taxes to fund
education.7 9 Although the state was supposed to contribute aid
pursuant to a funding formula, it lacked funds to do so and instead distributed money for schools through an appropriations
process.80 Because this process provided only minimal state aid,
the court held that the system81did not fufill poor students' consti-tutional right to an education.
The McDuffy plaintiffs asked the court for a declaratory judgment, not for a particular remedy.' This fact allowed the court
to give the legislature discretion to determine what kind of system
would be appropriate. The court did hold that, at a minimum, the
new system must enable students to possess the seven capabilities
set forth by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose."
Three days after the McDuffy decision, the legislature passed
the Massachusetts Education Reform Act of 1993 (MERA), 4
75.

615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).

76. Id.at 527.
77. Id. at 553-54. See generally Michael D. Weisman & Mark A. Sinionoff, McDuffy
v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education: A New Era for Public School Children
in Massachusetts, BOSTON BJ., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 13 (discussing the court's analysis of the
Massachusetts education clause).

78. McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 553-54. The defendants conceded that plaintiffs in poor
districts suffered from, among other things, "inadequate teaching of basic subjects ... ;
neglected libraries; inability to attract and retain high quality teachers; lack of teacher
training, lack of curriculum development; lack of predictable funding; administrative reductions; and inadequate guidance counseling." Id. at 553.
79. Id at 550.
80. 1Id at 551.
81.
82.

Id
Id at 522.

83. See supra note 37.
84. Act of June 18, 1993, ch. 71, 1993 Mass. Acts 159, amended by Act of June 21,
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which will not be fully funded until the year 2000. MERA instituted a new foundation budget for each district.' The foundation
budget is the total amount of money that the legislature believes a
district needs in order to fund its educational programs. The state
calculates each district's budget according to the same formula."

MERA, like Kentucky's scheme, requires a minimum local
contribution to the foundation budget to receive state aid.' The

required contribution accounts for a municipality's property wealth
and income level.8" Once the state determines the local

municipality's required contribution, the state subtracts that

1995, ch. 38, 1995 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 160 (Law. Co-op.).
85. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
86. The formula for determining a district's foundation budget is complex. The basic
elements are as follows: Fiscal year 1995 budget = foundation payroll + foundation
nonsalary expenses + expanded allotment program + professional development allotment
+ extraordinary maintenance allotment + book and equipment allotment (BEA). MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). The base year for calculating the
foundation budget is 1993, and the foundation budget for the present year cannot exceed
that of the prior year by more than 4.5%. Ch. 70, §§ 2, 3. No district that is spending
above the foundation budget can reduce its spending below that level. MASS. DEP'T OF
EDUC., FUNDING FORMULA RESOURCE MATERIALS 19 (May 1994) [hereinafter MASS.

FUNDING FORMULA RSOURCE].
The state determines each element of the foundation budget by multiplying
statutory fractions by the foundation enrollment. See ch. 70, § 2. The formula bases the
foundation enrollment for fiscal year 1995 on the enrollment on October 1st of 1993.
MASS. FUNDING FORMULA RESOURCE, supra, at 1, 20. The state breaks the foundation
enrollment down into categories by grade and program (e.g., 1 teacher per 22 elementary
students, 1 teacher per 15 bilingual students). See ch. 70, § 2. The formula assumes that
3.5% of a district's pupils are special education students. Ch. 70, § 2.
The foundation payroll (FP) is the amount of money for teacher and support staff
salaries. The FP assumes specific salaries for all school personnel. For example, the FP
for teachers is $38,000 multiplied by a wage adjustment factor. Ch. 70, § 2.
87. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
88. The minimum required local contribution = preliminary local contribution - overburden aid amount - excess debt service amount. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1995).
A school district's required preliminary local contribution takes into account the
district's prior local contribution, a municipal revenue growth factor, and an excess debt
service amount if it was used to lower a district's minimum contribution in the prior
year. Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 38, § 92, 1995 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 160, 508 (Law.
Co-op.) (to be codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2). The gross standard of effort
for fiscal year 1994 was the amount that would have been raised by applying a tax rate
of $9.40 to the adjusted valuation of the district's property. MASS. FUNDING FORMULA
RESOURCE, supra note 86, at 13. Districts with property values in the bottom fifth percentile and districts with a below average per capita income are allocated an overburden
aid amount that equals the district's standard of effort gap. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, §
2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
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amount from the foundation budget and funds the difference. The
state pays its share through a combination of aid allocations.89
MERA's new finance system, however, fails to equalize expenditures among districts because it lacks horizontal equity, vertical
equity, and fiscal neutrality. Although MERA provides that a
district's foundation budget cannot grow by more than 4.5% over
the preceding year, it does not cap the dollar amount of revenue
that wealthy districts can raise.9' MERA's foundation plan thus
fails to provide horizontal equity because it establishes a floor of
revenue for poor districts without creating a ceiling for wealthy
ones. Because the state will not fully fund the system until the
year 2000, current horizontal spending inequities will increase.
MERA also lacks vertical equity. The formula fails to account
for differences among districts when determining the districts'
foundation budgets.9 For example, the formula assumes specific
salaries for all personnel and that each district has a 3.5% special
education enrollment.' The state also calculates the book and
equipment allotment (BEA) regardless of a district's wealth. 93
Thus, the current scheme does not give a greater priority for BEA
assistance to poor districts with the most need for educational
resources. MERA attempts, although unsuccessfully, to create fiscal
neutrality by accounting for a district's income level when determining the district's required local contribution. However, districts
subject to the flat gross standard of effort rate do not have the
same ability as wealthy districts to tax at this rate.
Although not a perfectly equitable system, MERA's broad
substantive educational reforms appear capable of improving the
quality of education in poor districts. MERA encourages districts
to use new funds for curriculum enrichment through MERA's

89. The different types of state aid include 1) base aid; 2) regional bonus aid; 3)
foundation aid; 4) equity aid; and 5) minimum/professional development aid. MASS. ANN.

LAws ch. 70, § 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); MASS. FUNDING FORMULA RESOURCE,
supra note 86, at 4. Each school district is guaranteed funding of $25 per student, irrespective of wealth. Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 38, § 264, 1995 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 160,
576 (Law. Co-op.) (to be codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2).

90. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 3 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
91. See generally Thomas A. Downes & Thomas F. Pogue, Adjusting School Aid

Formulas For The Higher Cost Of Educating Disadvantaged Students, NAT'L TAX J., Mar.
1994, at 89 (discussing how a formula's failure to compensate for cost differentials among
districts leads to inadequate state aid).

92. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
93. See id.
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creation of curriculum framework committees and a new student
assessment program. 4 MERA also established a new governance
structure, which provides for school-based management and academic achievement profiles.95 Schools that do not perform according to state guidelines are subject to sanctions, which include the
appointment of a state "receiver" to manage the school district. 6
On the local level, Massachusetts districts have devoted a
large portion of new aid to curriculum enrichment. Several poor
districts spent the bulk of their new funding to hire professional
staff in order to expand their course selection. 7 Districts also
purchased textbooks, new equipment, and supplies.98 For example, the Brockton school district, which received approximately
$5.7 million in funding, spent over $4 million of the aid to hire
professional staff.99 The Lowell school district used over $4 million to add personnel'f and also filled seventy-seven new staff
positions for five new and renovated schools.'
MERA's stability of state aid gives districts somewhat of an
incentive to invest in long-term curriculum improvements. The formula provides that a district's base aid will, at a minimum, equal
the amount of the prior year."° Because foundation enrollment
for fiscal year 1995 is based on 1993 attendance figures,0 3 however, poor districts with rising enrollment may be deterred from
making long-term investments because their per-pupil aid receipts
will continually decrease.

94. MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC., EDUCATION REFORM 3RD QUARTERLY IMPLEMENTATION REPORT 2 (Spring 1994) [hereinafter 3RD QUARTERLY IMPLEMENTATION REPORT].
95.

Id. at 9.

96. 1d
97.

See generally MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC, THE REFORM ACr-USE OF FUNDS SUM-

MARY OF SCHOOL EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1993 AND 1994 (1994) [hereinafter

MASS. FUNDS 1994] (describing how districts used state funding); MAss. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
THE REFORM ACT-UsE OF FUNDS SUMMARY OF SCHOOL EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL

YEARS 1993-1994 (1993) [hereinafter MASS. FUNDS 1993] (same).
98. See generally MASS. FUNDS 1994, supra note 97; MASS. FUNDS 1993, supra note

97.
99. MASS. FUNDS 1994, supra note 97, at 1; MASS. FUNDS 1993, supra note 97, at 1.
100. MASS. FUNDS 1994, supra note 97, at 2; MASS. FUNDS 1993, supra note 97, at 2.
101. Mass. Dep't of Educ., Education Reform Funds Making a Difference, EDUC. TODAY, Aug. 1, 1994, at 1, 2.
102. Act of June 21, 1995, ch. 38, § 89, 1995 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 160, 507 (Law.
Co-op.) (to be codified at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 70, § 2).
103. See supra note 86.
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MERA appropriately provides for accountability components
to ensure that districts use aid to improve the quality of education
that students receive. For example, all schools must participate in
a new certification process and in professional development programs."04 The state also created an education reform implementation task force and review commission. 5 It will be difficult,
however, for some districts to fulfill these new mandates in light of
the assumptions that the funding formula makes about the characteristics of school districts. In addition, although Massachusetts
adopted numerous incentives to upgrade education in poor districts, the state has not yet enacted the majority of its reform
progams.
Arguably, the substantive educational improvements that
MERA's state oversight provides render the system's lack of fiscal
equity between poor and wealthy districts immaterial. Under this
rationale, as long as the system gives poor districts a sufficient
"minimum," it does not matter how much wealthy districts spend,
especially when the McDuffy court did not explicitly require all
districts to receive equal funding. However, due to the "dynamics
of state politics," the amount of state aid allotments typically are
determined by what wealthy school districts believe poor districts
need. 36 Unfortunately, legislatures have not been inclined to set
the minimum aid level at an amount that would enable poor students to compete on a level with wealthy students." Instead, aid
allotments have been geared towards enabling a poor student to
hold a less-skilled j6b.'" Although "[t]here is a deep-seated reverence for fair play in the United States ... and a genuine distaste for loaded dice,"'" legislatures have not truly committed
themselves to leveling the educational playing field.
C. New Jersey
The New Jersey Supreme Court, unlike most other state high
courts, has ruled on the constitutionality of both initial and revised
funding schemes. In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court held

104.

3RD QUARTERLY IMPLEMENTATION REPORT, supra note 94, at 12.

105. Id at 15.
106. KOZOL, supra note 1, at 209.
107. Id.

108. See id.
109. Id at 223.
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that the New Jersey Public School Education Act of 1975 (the
Act)"1 was facially constitutional and that the state's education
clause imposed a duty on the legislature to provide students with a
"thorough and efficient" education."' Plaintiffs successfully challenged the Act as applied in Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1).112 The
Abbott I court held that the Act's finance provisions were unconstitutional because they failed to ensure that poor school districts
had a "thorough and efficient" education." 3 The court emphasized that the Act was only unconstitutional as applied to poor
districts." 4 If the finance system granted poor students a sufficient level of revenue, then the Act would be constitutional even
if some districts spent beyond that level." 5 Thus, the ground for
unconstitutionality was not funding disparity, but that the level of
education in poor districts did not meet a certain threshold of
quality." 6 The court found that poor districts, unlike their
wealthy counterparts, lacked adequate computer training, suitable
facilities, science education, and foreign language programs."7 In
Jersey City, for example, computer courses were taught in storage
closets."' In an East Orange middle school, teachers taught science class in a three-foot by six-foot science area that lacked water, gas, and electrical lines." 9

The Act's funding scheme provided each district with a guaranteed tax base (GTB) of at least 134% of the state average."n
The state set a tax rate for each district at the GTB amount.'
If the districts generated revenue below the GTB level, the state

110. Act of Sept. 29, 1975, ch. 212, 1975 NJ. Laws 871. The New Jersey legislature
subsequently modified the Act's funding provisions when the legislature adopted the

Quality Education Act of 1990. Act of July 3, 1990, ch. 52, 1990 NJ. Laws 587 (codified
as amended at NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7D-1 to 18A:66-66 (West Supp. 1995)). See infra
notes 132-140 and accompanying text.

111. Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson V), 355 A.2d 129, 132 (NJ. 1976). The Robinson V
court held that New Jersey's Public School Education Act of 1975 was facially constitutional, assuming that it would be fully funded. Id. at 139.
112. 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990).
113. Id. at 384.
114. Id. at 368.
115. Id.
116. Id.

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 395-97.
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
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funded the difference." The state's share was called "equalization aid."'" The court noted that the Act did not require or assure a particular level of expenditure in any school district. 24
The level of equalization aid depended completely on the GTB
level and discretionary budget decisions.
Although the court recognized that equalization aid gave poor
districts more money than they would have received otherwise,
there were several problems with the way that the state calculated
equalization aid. The flaw that most seriously hampered poor
school districts was the state's reliance on districts' budgets from
the previous year as a basis for calculating the amount of equalization aid. The court held that failing to provide current-year
funding created a disincentive for districts to enrich their educational programs."z To achieve the constitutional standard, "the
totality of the [poor] districts' educational offering must contain
elements over and above those found in the affluent suburban
district."' 26 The record showed that the need of poor urban students exceeded that of wealthy students because poor districts had
higher dropout rates and lower standardized test scoresY 7
The Abbott I court, unlike those previously discussed, did
prescribe a remedy for the legislature. First, the court held that
funding must be certain every year and cannot depend on the
budgeting and taxing decisions of local school boards." The level of funding must be enough to provide for the special needs of
the poor districts.'29 Although the court left the legislature discretion to create the funding mechanism itself, the court emphasized that the new system could not depend on how much a poor
urban district was willing to tax." Second, the poor districts
must have a budget per pupil that is approximately equal to the
average of wealthy districts plus the amount necessary to meet
their special needs. 3 '

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id. at 379.
Id at 402.

127. Id at 400-02.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id at 408.
Id.
Id at 409.
Id
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Shortly after Abbott I, the New Jersey legislature passed the

Quality of Education Act (QEA) of 1990.132 The QEA failed to

pass constitutional muster in Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1)."3 The
QEA sought to reduce expenditure disparities between the thirty

poorest "special needs districts" and the 108 wealthiest districts by
the 1995-1996 school year."

According to Abbott II, the QEA

failed to reduce per pupil spending disparities between wealthy
and poor districts because the QEA did not guarantee enough
funding to pay for its authorized level of spending. 35
The QEA adopted a foundation funding formula in an attempt to comply with the Abbott I court's mandate that aid cannot
be based on a district's fiscal capacity. The QEA established a
Maximum Foundation Budget (MB) for each district. The computation of the MB gave poor districts an amount above the average
per pupil expenditure in the wealthiest districts with additions for
categories such as special education and vocational school. 6
Since 1992, special needs districts have been able to increase their

MBs through an additional special needs weight of 1.05 for each
grade category."3 To qualify for state aid, a district must contrib-

132. Act of July 3, 1990, ch. 52, 1990 N.J. Laws 587 (codified as amended at NJ.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:7D-1 to 18A:66-66 (West Supp. 1995)).
133. 643 A.2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994).
134. William A. Firestone et al., New Jersey's Quality Education Act: Fiscal, Programmatic, Curricular and Intergovernmental Effects 2 (Apr. 1994) (symposium presentation at
the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association) (on file with author). The legislature denominated the poorest 30 districts as special need districts
(SNDs). Abbott 11, 643 A.2d at 576.
135. The Abbott II court noted that while the QEA contains a commitment to parity,
special needs districts were only spending 84% of wealthy district expenditures. Abbott II,
643 A.2d at 576-77. Before the QEA, this figure was at least 70%. Id. Although the
QEA raised an additional $800 million for education through income and sales tax increases, poor districts received only $257 million. Firestone et al., supra note 134, at 5-6.
The state primarily directed the remainder at property tax relief. William A. Firestone et
al., Where Did the $800 Million Go? The First Year of New Jersey's Quality Education
Act, 16 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 359, 360 (1994).

136. The formula for a district's MB = (F x U) + C. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-6
(West Supp. 1995). F = the state foundation amount; U = the number of foundation aid
units for pupils in the district; and C = the facilities component. § 18A:7D-6. Since the
1991-92 school year, F has equalled $6,640 per pupil, and C has equalled $107.00 per
pupil. § 18A:7D-6(b). U is determined by adding the products obtained by multiplying
the number of students in particular grade and program categories by set foundation
weights ranging from .5 to 1.33. § 18A:7D-6(a). The Abbott II court emphasized that the
state calculated these weights ineffectively because the state had not studied the actual
costs of providing services for at-risk pupils. Abbott 11, 643 A.2d at 578-79.
137. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-6(a) (West Supp. 1995).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:397

ute its "fair share," which is determined by using equalized property valuations and personal income. 13' The amount of state
foundation aid to a district is the difference between a district's
MB and its local fair share. 39
To promote equity, the QEA instituted yearly spending caps
on budget increases that were separate from the MB. The permissible annual cap increases for special needs districts were higher
than the ones for wealthy districts.' Equity was not guaranteed,
however, because the state did not require poor districts to spend
up to the cap.' The Abbott II court held that another flaw in
the QEA's design was the absence of a link between the spending
cap and the MB. 42 Without a nexus between the cap and the
MB, the calculation of the cap yielded a different budget amount
than the computation of the MB. Thus, a gap existed between
what was needed to achieve parity between poor and wealthy districts and the amount of money that the state provided through
the foundation budget.
Due to problems with the QEA's spending cap design, the
court determined that the only way to achieve equity under the
current formula was to increase the special needs weight under the
MB. However, the legislature had total discretion when determining the special needs weight. Because the mode of achieving parity
under the QEA was discretionary, the QEA did not comply with
Abbott I's mandate of funding certainty. 4 The Abbott II court
held that equal funding does not guarantee equality of education,
"[b]ut it is nonetheless clear that there is a significant connection
between the sums expended and the quality of the educational
opportunity."' 45 Although the court in Abbott I held that the legislature only had to provide poor districts with a sufficient floor of

138. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-7 (West Supp. 1995); BETH D. BADER, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., ABBOTT V. BURKE VS. NEW

JERSEY: POLICY, POLITICS AND POLITICAL

ECONOMY 22 (1991).
139. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-4 (West Supp. 1995).
140. Firestone et al., supra note 134, at 6.
141. Abbott II, 643 A.2d at 577-78.
142. The court noted that the Department of Education did not even calculate what

the equity spending caps were for the 1993-94 school year. Id. at 578.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 580 (quoting Robinson v. Cahill (Robinson 1), 303 A.2d 273, 277 (N.J.
1973)).
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revenue, the Abbott II court switched gears and primarily focused
on spending disparities between poor and wealthy districts.
The Abbott II court properly held that the QEA is not an
equitable finance system. Although the QEA improves the degree
of horizontal equity among students by reducing disparities from
30% to 16%, the QEA falls short of the court's mandate to provide "substantially equal" educational funding."4 Because the
QEA's budget spending cap is not linked to the foundation formula, it cannot equalize expenditures. Nor does the scheme provide
for vertical equity. The court appropriately noted that the legislature determined the amounts of the additional weightings without
empirical data about the actual costs of educating students. 47
New Jersey's QEA formula, however, does promote fiscal
neutrality. The fair share component accounts for each district's
income level so that the tax burdens will be equitably distributed.
Although the fair share element promotes neutrality, a district's
ability to raise revenue for education is still heavily dependent on
its property wealth because the QEA inadequately funds necessary
reform.
Despite the formula's failure to provide equity, a study of ten
local school districts' use of additional funding during the QEA's
first year illustrates that the QEA does encourage poor districts to
expand their core curricula." The QEA requires each special
needs district (SND) to develop and submit an Education Improvement Plan (EIP) to the state that incorporates recommendations made by external review teams.'49 "The EIPs identified

educational goals for each district, strategies for achieving these

146. 1l A study of the QEA's horizontal equity showed that it closed the spending
gap among special needs districts to a greater degree than it closed the disparity between
supra note 135, at 363.
wealthy and special needs districts. See Firestone, et al.,
147. The element of arbitrariness that exists for the additional weights is not unique
to New Jersey's scheme. None of the states with foundation formulas appear to have

formulated them pursuant to empirical data.
148.

The districts in the study were divided into three categories: five special-needs

districts, two foundation-aid districts, and three transition-aid districts. Firestone et al.,
supra note 135, at 363-64. Special-needs districts received the most state aid under the

new finance system. Id.Foundation-aid districts received a moderate amount of additional
aid. Id.at 365. Transition-aid districts were generally wealthy districts that received the
smallest state-aid increase. Id.

149. Id. at 360; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-32 (West Supp. 1995).
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goals, and ways
new QEA dollars would be used to implement the
50
strategies.'
The school district study revealed that the SNDs received an
additional $534 to $1,549 per pupil."' They spent nearly half of
the new revenue on instruction and student services. 2 Three of
the five SNDs used aid to increase their staff or reinstate programs that the SNDs previously cut. 5 3 Although SNDs did not
spend money on additional materials and resources, QEA funds
helped to equalize their availability. 54 Four of the SNDs invested in facilities by building new structures, refurbishing buildings,
and installing laboratories. 5
Moreover, the QEA's long-range planning requirement encouraged poor districts to improve and expand course offerings.
Districts created health and social service programs, weekend and
summer school programs, extracurricular activities, and early childhood education programs. 5 The districts also added elective
course offerings such as home economics, industrial education, and
Advanced Placement classes. 57 Special needs districts have reported that the QEA's
oversight influenced their decisions about
158
how to use resources.
In addition to initiating curriculum expansion, the QEA system has an accountability component that encourages districts to
use QEA funding responsibly and to invest in curriculum improvements. Each district's EIP plan has to "identify, price, and justify"
expenditures to the state. 59 The QEA, however, lacks a mechanism that can measure how additional funds given to SNDs improve educational quality. Although test scores may provide an
indirect measurement of the quality of education in poor districts,
the tests are not given at each grade level and have a narrow scope."6

150. Firestone et al., supra note 135, at 360.

151. Id. at 363.
152. Id. at 365.
153. Id. at 366.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 367.
156. Id.
157.

Id.

158. Firestone et al., supra note 134, at 37-38.
159. Firestone et al., supra note 135, at 370; NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D-32 (West
Supp. 1995).
160. The state only tests students in grades three, six, and nine. Firestone et al., supra
note 135, at 370.
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Curriculum expansion in poor districts could be hampered by
the uncertainty of the QEA's status and funding. The Abbott 11
court's invalidation of the QEA will force the legislature to revise
its fiscal system. In addition, political haggling has prevented the
New Jersey legislature from setting state aid figures for forthcoming years.' 6' Until these issues are resolved, districts may be reluctant to invest in programs that have long-term expenses.
School reform critics argue that revised systems only marginally improve the quality of education in poor districts while
impermissibly making drastic cuts in wealthy districts' programs.
Thus, critics contend that the net effect of reform is an overall
"leveling down" of educational quality throughout the state. However, the local effects of QEA reform demonstrate that this fear
did not materialize. Wealthy districts did not make any substantial
curriculum reductions. They only had to make minor cuts in educational services, "which resulted as much from residents' unwillingness to tax themselves to the level allowed by the state as from
reduced state funds."' 62 Furthermore, the QEA actually gave
wealthy districts increases in state aid ranging from 5% to
27%.63 Thus, in the QEA's first year, the finance reforms did
not appear to denigrate educational programs in wealthy districts.
Although the New Jersey legislature has not yet responded to
the Abbott I decision, Abbott Hi's impact undoubtedly will be a
funding increase to poor districts to remedy the QEA's improper
preservation of expenditure disparities. If the new system retains
the QEA's curriculum expansion and improvement initiatives, New
Jersey's poor schools will make additional strides toward educational equality.
D. Tennessee
The Tennessee Supreme Court, unlike the Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New Jersey courts, used state equal protection
grounds to invalidate Tennessee's school funding scheme. In Tennessee Small School Systems v. McWherter,'" the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the state's school finance system, which

161.
162.
163.
164.

Id
Id. at 359.
Id. at 364, 368.
851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
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relied heavily on local property taxes, created spending disparities
among school districts.'65 The court found that the state's funding
scheme created a wealth-based classification of similarly situated
students and was unconstitutional because the system lacked even
a rational basis."
At the time of McWherter, the largest source of state funding
was the Tennessee Foundation Program (TFP) 67 The TFP was a
standard foundation formula that allocated aid based on the number of students in average daily attendance, weighted by additional
cost factors such as grade level, vocational courses, and special
education.' 6 Districts that were unable to raise the foundation
amount received equalization aid to make up the difference. 169
The court found, however, that the TFP's equalization element
comprised only a0 small portion of total state aid and was inad17
equately funded.
The record established that the TFP did not provide poor
districts with enough funding to maintain an adequate educational
system. Schools in poor districts lacked adequate facilities, textbooks, functioning libraries, and the funds to implement statemandated art and music classes.' Poor districts had substantially
fewer educational opportunities than wealthy districts.' 2 For example, in a Hancock County school, a so-called "library" consisted
of "only one bookcase nestled in a room containing empty boxes,
surplus furniture, a desktop copier, kitchen supplies, a bottle of
mouthwash, and a popcorn machine."'
The McWherter court rejected the state's contention that the
system was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose of promoting local control over schools.'74 The court noted that the
165. Id at 143-147. The court noted that in 1988-89, per classroom spending varied
from $110,727 in Kingsport to $49,167 in Lewis County. Id. at 143. Per pupil spending
among districts ranged fror

$3,669 to $1,823. Id.

166. Id. at 152-57.
167. Id. at 143. The other sources of state funding were categorical grants that the
state distributed irrespective of a district's wealth. Id

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id Tennessee had less than $60 million available for equalization aid out of a
$2.5 billion education budget Id. The court also noted that the equalization element of
the TFP benefited wealthier districts because it made upward adjustments in aid for those
with highly experienced and trained teachers. Id.

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 145.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 145.
The Tennessee court thus did not adopt the U.S. Supreme Court's rationale in
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goal of local management did not justify disparities in educational
opportunities.' 5 The court emphasized that a system that provides for greater equalization of funds actually promotes local
control because equalization gives poor districts more educational
choices.'76
Unlike the New Jersey court, the McWherter court did not
suggest a legislative remedy. The McWherter court's only mandate
was that the legislature establish a public school system that provides substantially equal educational opportunities to all Tennessee
students.' 77 The court emphasized that the key issues were quality and equality of education, not merely equality of funding. 78
After the McWherter decision, the Tennessee General Assem17 9
bly enacted the Education Improvement Act of 1991 (EIA).
Like Kentucky's KERA program, Tennessee's EIA makes broad
revisions in the state's entire educational system. The EIA devotes
more than half of Tennessee's general fund budget to education.Y The state distributes the majority of these funds through
a new percentage equalizing scheme called the Basic Education
Program (BEP).' Under this system, the Tennessee Department
of Education establishes a budget for each district by organizing
the educational costs of students into classroom and nonclassroom
components.'" The BEP creates a funding level for each component based on the number and type of students (e.g., students on
free/reduced lunch) in each district. The state's share of the costs
of the BEP, which is expected to be fully funded by July of 1997,
is 75% of the classroom components and 50% of the non-class-

Rodriguez that a system that relies heavily on local property taxes to fund education is

rationally related to a legitimate state purpose of promoting local control over schools.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
175. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 154.
176. Id.
177. 1&dat 156.
178. Id.

179. Act of Mar. 11, 1992, ch. 535, 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts 19 (codified as amended at
TENN. CODE ANN. Tities 8, 49 (Supp. 1995)).
180.

TENN. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE FINANCE OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN TEN-

NESSEE 1 (no date) (on file with author).
181. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-3-351(a) (Supp. 1995).
182. TENN. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., supra note 180, at app. C. Classroom components
include regular, special, and vocational education, art and music courses, principals, nurs-

es, librarians, and substitute teachers. Id. at app. E. Nonclassroom components consist of,
among other things, staff benefits and insurance, noninstructional equipment, transporta-

tion, secretarial support, and maintenance. Id. at app. C.
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room components.1 3 The counties collectively fund the remaining
25% of the classroom components and 50% of the non-classroom
components.1 4 The state determines a district's individual share
through a fiscal capacity index that represents a district's ability to
fund education from its own taxable sources." To receive state
aid, each county must fund its fiscal capacity index for both the
classroom and nonclassroom components.1m
Unlike the Massachusetts court, the McWherter court focused
on districts' expenditure disparities in holding that the Tennessee
scheme was unconstitutional. The finance element of the new
BEP, however, fails to equalize spending among districts. If the
BEP is fully funded by 1997, there still will be an estimated 36%
disparity between the wealthy and poor districts in the 95th and
5th percentiles." This disparity is twice as great as the one that
exists under the New Jersey and Kentucky schemes.
Because the BEP recognizes the costs of educating different
types of students, it has a degree of vertical equity. In addition,
the BEP is more fiscally neutral than the New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Kentucky schemes. When determining a county's individual share of education costs, the BEP not only provides for income differences among districts but also accounts for a county's
resident tax burdens." The state also bases the calculation of a

183. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-3-354(i), 49-3-356 (Supp. 1995). The state funds EIA
reforms through a half-cent increase in the state sales tax. GOVERNOR NED
MCWHERTER, TENN. DEP'T OF EDUC., TENNESSEE: THE TICKET TO ToMoRRow 2 (July
1993).

184. TENN. CODE ANN. §49-3-356 (Supp. 1995); HARRY A. GREEN, TENN. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL, FISCAL EQUALIZATION OF THE BASIC EDUCATION PROGRAM 1 (Apr. 1994).
185. TENN. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL, LOCAL FISCAL CAPAciTY FOR FUNDING EDUCATION IN TENNESSEE 9 (July 1994). Fiscal capacity is determined by five measurements: "fiscal effort, tax capacity based on property and sales,
ability to pay based on per capita income, [resident] tax burden, and service responsibility based on school population as a percent of total population." Md The formula is
based on a three-year moving average of the data used, which means that the oldest
year of data is dropped and the current year of data is added. Id. at 10.
186. For example, if total statewide BEP classroom funding is $500 million, then a
district with a fiscal capacity index of 1.25% would have a required local share of $6.25
million ($500,000,000 x 1.25% = $6,250,000). Id. at 47. If total statewide BEP nonclassroom funding is $400 million, then the county would have a required local share of $5
million ($400,000,000 x 1.25% = $5,000,000). Id. Fiscal capacity indexes in fiscal year 1995
ranged from .03% to 20.83%. 1& at 32-34.
187. GREEN, supra note 184, at 3.
188.

TENN. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL REL, supra note 185, at 9.
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county's minimum contribution on a three-year moving average to
help ensure accuracy. 9 However, the BEP has drawbacks for
local districts. Unlike the foundation formula schemes in other

states, the BEP requires local districts to fund a portion of the
state's total education costs, not just a part of the district's own
needs.' 9 Districts thus have to pay for the expenses of other
school systems. As the state moves toward full funding of the
BEP, the districts' share of costs also will increase, even if districts
are not adding new services or experiencing enrollment growth.
Tennessee's EIA, like Kentucky and New Jersey's systems,
appropriately requires local districts to expand and enrich curriculum offerings. Every new dollar generated by the EIA must be
earmarked for education; none of it can be used to increase salaries.'9 1 Districts must spend at least 76 cents of each dollar on

classroom improvements such as new teachers, textbooks, and
instructional technology." Districts can spend the remaining 24
cents on items such as utilities, transportation, and maintenance. 3 Although the EIA gives local districts much less discretion than any other state, a high level of state oversight can increase the public's acceptance of the plan and create a closer
nexus between new aid and educational equality.Y
Because the BEP is a percentage equalizing system, Tennessee
provides districts with a greater amount of funding stability than
states with foundation funding programs. Foundation funding
schemes have placed a legislative "ceiling" on the amount of per
pupil aid based on the number of students in attendance during
prior years. In contrast, a percentage equalizing system bases the
state contribution on a percentage of a districts' total costs. This
system gives districts a greater incentive to expand upon their
programs because they may be able to recoup a greater portion of
their expenses.
The curriculum enrichment effects of the new funding system
can be observed at the local school district level. In Carter Coun-

189. Id. at 10.
190. See id. at 24.
191. McWHERTER, supra note 183, at 4. Banning salary increases for teachers can be
problematic, however, because offering a lucrative salary can be an effective means of
recruitment.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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ty, schools spent $250,000 to update textbooks for each grade.195
One high school built a fully equipped computer lab. 96 The addition of the lab prompted new courses in word processing, databases, and spreadsheets."9 In Warren County, schools added Japanese, Spanish, French, and Latin courses.'98 Jefferson County
schools added twelve new teachers to reduce class sizes. 9 9 They
also purchased computer equipment and supplies for vocational
courses.' °° Under the new funding system, the amount of money
spent on new teitbooks, materials, and supplies increased by more
than 200% from 1992 levels to a total of nearly $30 million. "°
Through additional capital outlay and technology allotments,
school systems spent over $6.5 million on capital improvements
and more than $86 million on new technologies in 1993-94.2°
Furthermore, the EIA properly has raised academic standards
by increasing core curriculum requirements and mandating the
availability of kindergarten. °3 All high schools must implement a
two-track curriculum: one for college bound students and one for
those entering the work force. 2" The state also requires high
schools to create objectives for each student that include communication, critical thinking, and problem-solving goals.2 5 These new
requirements will stimulate expansion of schools' core curricula
and diversify elective offerings.
The EIA also has new accountability initiatives that promote
curriculum additions. The Tennessee Department of Education
established a new standardized testing program called the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS). 2 6 The TVAAS
ascertains how much Tennessee students are learning in each subject area in comparison to national averages.'
In addition,
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

MCWHERTER, supra note 183, at 5.
I.
Id.
Id at 6.
Id. at 7.
Id

201. WAYNE QUALLS, TENN. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., STATUS REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 21ST CENTURY SCHOOLS PROGRAM 3 (Apr. 1994).

202.
203.
204.

IdL
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-201(c) (Supp. 1995).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1-212(a) (Supp. 1995).

205.

TENN. STATE BD. OF EDUC., HIGH SCHOOL POLICY: A NEW VISION FOR TEN-

NESSEE HIGH SCHOOLS 4, 6 (Nov. 1993).
206. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-601-10 (Supp. 1995).
207. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1-601(b) (Supp. 1995); WILLIAM A. SANDERS & SAN-
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schools must meet five different performance goals by the year
200.2000 The state distributes annual report cards summarizing the
progress that districts make toward these goals.

9

Districts can

use TVAAS scores and report card data to assess how new programs influence student achievement. Thus, although the Tennessee system does not substantially narrow the gap between wealthy
and poor districts' expenditures, the system's emphasis on improving the quality of poor districts' curricula will help poor districts
attain educational equality.
E. Texas
Texas, like New Jersey, has endured extensive school finance
litigation. The original Texas system operated under a foundation
funding program. The foundation program had a two-tiered level
of funding.21 The first tier guaranteed districts a base level of
funding per student in average daily attendance.2"' The state encouraged districts but did not require them to generate a minimum
"fair share" before receiving tier I funds.2" 2 The second tier had
an equalization component designed to supplement a district's
basic tier I allotment.2 3 At the second tier, the state guaranteed
districts a certain amount of revenue for each cent of tax effort
over tier I's encouraged fair share.2 14 The state funded the difference between the guaranteed amount and the revenue that the tax
effort collected.2" 5
The Texas legislature responded to a constitutional challenge
to the system by passing House Bill 72 (HB 72), which contributed

DRA HORN, THE UNIV. OF TENN., AN OVERVIEW OF THE TENNESSEE VALUE-ADDED

ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (TVAAS) (no date) (on file with author).
208. For example, schools should have a 95% attendance rate in grades K-6, and a
93% attendance rate in grades 7-12 by the year 2000. NED MCWHERTER & WAYNE
QUALLS, TENN. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., 21ST CENTURY SCHOOLS REPORT CARD 1
(Oct. 1994).
209.

NED MCWHERTER & WAYNE QUAUS, TENN. STATE DEP'T OF EDUC, STATE

OF THE ART CLASSROOMS THAT DEMAND ACCOUNTABILrrY 1 (Oct. 1994).
210. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I), 804 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Tex.
1991).
211. Id.
212. Carrolton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. DisL
(Edgewood 111), 826 S.W.2d 489, 498 (Tex. 1992).
213. Edgewood 11, 804 S.W.2d at 495.
214. Id.

215. Id.
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more money to the foundation funding formula and entitled districts that met certain wealth and effort criteria to an additional
enrichment equalization allotment. 16 Although BB 72 increased
funding for poor districts, the Texas Supreme Court invalidated
this scheme in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
(Edgewood I).217 The Edgewood I court found that a substantial
disparity existed in districts' ability to raise revenue.218 The court
noted that although the foundation program attempted to ensure
that all districts had a minimum floor of revenue, the state inadequately funded the program and did not even cover the costs of
meeting state-mandated educational requirements.2"9
The Texas legislature subsequently passed Senate Bill 1 (SB
1) in 1990. SB 1 required local districts to tax at a minimum
rate before receiving tier I aid." SB 1 also contained incentives
for districts to set tax rates above the minimum level to maximize
funding under tiers I and 11.22 Despite these changes, in
Edgewood II, the Texas Supreme Court held that SB 1 was unconstitutional because it distributed funds under essentially the same
inefficient foundation system that existed in Edgewood L2 The
Edgewood II court found that merely producing a more equitable
system did not correct the educational "opportunity gaps" that still
existed between wealthy and poor districts.'
The Texas legislature's third attempt at creating a permissible
system resulted in the passage of Senate Bill 351 (SB 351) in
1991' SB 351 redefined the two-tiered structure of the founda216. Act of July 13, 1984, ch. 28, 1984 Tex. Gen. Laws 117, amended by Act of May
30, 1995, ch. 260, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207 (Vernon); UNIV. OF TEXAS & TEXAS
CENTER FOR EDUC. RES., A DECADE OF CHANGE: PUBLIC EDUCATION ACTION RE-

FORM IN TEXAS 1981-1992, at 65-66 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter A DECADE OF CHANGE].
217. 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).

218. The amount of property wealth per student in the wealthiest and poorest districts
showed a disparity as high as 700 to 1. Id. at 392. Spending per student ranged from
$19,333 to $2,112. Id.
219. Id.
220. Act of June 7, 1990, ch. 1, 1990 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, amended by Act of May 30,
1995, ch. 260, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207 (Vernon); TERRY WHITNEY & AMY
HIGHTOWER, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT. LESSONS IN SCHOOL

FUNDING 1, at 4 (Feb. 1992).
221. Edgewood I, 804 S.W.2d 491, 495 (Tex. 1991).

222. Id.
223. Id
224. Id at 496.
225. Act of Apr. 15, 1991, ch. 20, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 381, amended by Act of June
7, 1991, ch. 391, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1475, amended by Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260,
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tion program. 6 In an attempt to equalize taxation efforts within
each county,227 SB 351 created County Education Districts
(CEDs) that levied and collected taxes.' The school finance system also set a cap on the rate that districts could tax.z However, the Texas Supreme Court held that SB 351 was unconstitutional in Edgewood III. The court found that the CED tax system
impermissibly created a statewide income tax."
The Texas Supreme Court recently ruled that the Texas legislature, on its fourth attempt, successfully created a constitutional
system"' .with the passage of Senate Bill 7 (SB 7).2 SB 7 set
a cap of $280,000 on the amount of taxable property value a district may have per student0 3 Districts that have wealth per student in excess of $280,000 can choose from among five options to
reduce their wealth.' 4 Options that do not require voter approv1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207 (Vernon).
226. A DECADE OF CHANGE, supra note 216, at 72.
227. WHITNEY & HIGHTOWER, supra note 220, at 2.
228. PIICUS & HERTERT, supra note 23, at 2.
229. Edgewood III, 826 S.W.2d 489, 499 (Tex. 1992).
230. Texas is one of only seven states that prohibits a state income tax. WHITNEY &
HIGHTOWER, supra note 220, at 2; TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-e. The court noted that
the legislature set a de facto tax rate for the CEDs when it mandated a minimum local
share for tier I funding. Edgewood 11I, 826 S.W.2d at 501. Taxpayers had a right to vote
on local tax rates for schools. By consolidating taxpayers into large CEDs, SB 351 made
citizens pay a state mandated tax rate for schools over which they had no control. Id. at
509-10, 514.
231. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 893 S.W.2d 450, 484 (Tex.
1995).
232. Act of May 31, 1993, ch. 347, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 1479, amended by Act of
May 30, 1995, ch. 260, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207 (Vernon). The Texas legislature
has recently recodified portions of SB 7s provisions under different section numbers. See
Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207 (Vernon). For clarity, this
Note continues to refer to the new Texas scheme as SB 7 because the Texas legislature
retained many of SB 7's provisions.
233. SB 7 Summarized, TEXAS EDUC. NEWS, May 31, 1993, at 1, 2. The $280,000 cap
is referred to as the equalized wealth level. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1,
§ 41.002(a), 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207, 2384 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx.
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a)). SB 7 eliminated SB 351's property tax rate cap.
Edgewood IV, 893 S.W.2d at 481-82.
234. SB 7 Summarized, supra note 233, at 1; Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1,
§ 41.003, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207, 2385 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 41.003). When SB 7 was adopted, 109 school districts had property wealth
per student in excess of $280,000. SB 7 Summarized, supra note 233, at 1. The state
penalizes wealthy districts that refuse to choose one of the five options. fI at 2. SB 7
provides that districts that are unable to maintain their 1992-93 level of spending without
raising taxes over a specified amount may retain wealth in excess of $280,000 per student
during a three-year phase-in period. Id.
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al are 1) voluntary consolidation with another districtff and 2)
detachment and annexation by agreement.~6 The remaining three
choices, which require voter approval, are 1) the purchase of attendance credits; 7 2) the creation of nonresident student education contracts;P8 and 3) tax base consolidation. 9 With one exception, all of the high wealth districts have sent excess funds to
the state or other school districts, even though doing so required
voter approval.2'
In addition to capping the amount of wealth per student that
a district may have, SB 7 slightly revised tiers I and II of the
foundation program. SB 7 lowered SB 351's basic allotment under
tier I to $2,300 per student each year, adjusted by a cost of education index.24 ' To receive tier I funds, a district still must provide

235. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 41.031-.034, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2387 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 41.031-.034). Under
this option, the governing boards of two or more districts may consolidate the districts
into one with a per pupil wealth of less than $280,000. For the first two years after
consolidation, the state will provide the consolidated district with the same amount of
state funding to which each district would have been separately entitled. Id.
236. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 41.061-.065, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2387-88 (Vernon) (to be codified at Tax. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 41.061-.065). Under this option, the governing boards of two or more districts may agree that territory
may be detached from one district and added to another district if, after the action, each
district has a per pupil wealth equal to or less than the equalized wealth level. Id.
237. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 41.091-.099, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2388-89 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 41.091-.099). A
district may purchase attendance credits from the state to lower its per pupil wealth.
Each credit would reduce a district's average daily attendance by one student per year.
Average daily attendance for the 1995-96 school year is determined by dividing the sum
of each day's attendance by the minimum number of school days. Act of May 30, 1995,
ch. 260, sec. 1, § 42.005(a-1), 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207, 2397 (Vernon) (to be
codified at Tax. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.005(a-1)).
238. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 41.121-.123, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2389-90 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 41.121-.123). Under this plan, a district may contract with another district to educate additional out-ofdistrict students. SB 7 Summarized, supra note 233, at 2.
239. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 41.151-.160, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2390-91 (Vernon) (to be codified at Tax. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 41.151-.160). Two
or more districts may agree, with voter approval, to consolidate tax bases as long as the
consolidated district has a per student wealth below the equalized wealth level. SB 7
Summarized, supra note 233, at 2.
240. Lawrence 0. Picus, The Local Impact of School Finance Reform in Four Texas
School Districts, 16 EDUC. EVALUATION AND POL'Y ANALYSIS 391, 392 (Winter 1994).
241. TEXAS EDuc. CODE ANN. §§ 16.101-2 (West Supp. 1995), amended by Act of
May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, § 42.101, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207, 2398 (Vernon)
(to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.101). The Texas legislature has subsequently increased the basic allotment to $2,387. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §
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its "minimum local fund assignment" (LFA) of costs. 242 The minimum tax rate a district must levy under the LFA for the 1994-95
school year was $.86 per $100 of property value for the prior tax
year.2 4 Tier II of the formula, like the older programs, guarantees each district an additional amount for up to $.64 of tax effort
above the LFA.2 4 The revised scheme, however, has lowered the
SB 351 guaranteed yield amount to $20.55 per student for every
cent of taxation over the LFA. 245
The Edgewood IV court properly noted that although SB 7
lowered the amount of revenue to which poor districts were entitled under SB 351, the SB 7 cap improved the degree of horizontal equity among districts.2' The margin, however, remains a
wide $600 per pupil when districts tax at the full tier II equalization rate.2 47 Like every other revised scheme, SB 7 also promotes
vertical equity among districts. Its tier I component provides for
add-on weights to account for the additional costs of educating
special, gifted, and bilingual students.2' The concept of fiscal
neutrality, however, is not fully embodied in SB 7's modifications.
Because the LFA is a flat rate per $100 of taxable property value,
the formula does not equalize the tax burden of receiving aid.
Unlike the other states mentioned, Texas improperly failed to
require poor districts to spend new aid on curriculum enrichment
programs. A study of the local effects of school finance reform
under the older SB 351 system shows that absent a nexus between

42.101, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207, 2398 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC.
CODE ANN. § 42.101). Under SB 351, however, this amount was $2,400 per student SB
7 Summarized, supra note 233, at 3. Tier I provides for additional funding for special
education, gifted students, compensatory, bilingual and vocational education, technology,

and transportation. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 42.151-.156, 1995 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 2207, 2399-405 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§

42.151-.156).
242. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, § 42.252, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207,

2406-07 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.252).
243. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, § 42.252(a), 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2406 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.252(a)); Edgewood
IV, 893 S.W.2d 450, 461 (Tex. 1995).
244. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 42.302-.303, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.

2207, 2411 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 42.302-.303).
245. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, see. 1, § 42.302(a), 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2411 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 42.302(a)); Edgewood
IV, 893 S.W.2d at 467.

246. Edgewood IV, 893 S.W.2d at 464.
247. Id.at 464-65.
248. See discussion supra note 241.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:397

additional aid and substantive educational improvement, poor
districts may not use revenue effectively to improve educational
quality.24 9 Out of an $11 million aid increase, District LM only
invested approximately $2 million in new educational programs 5" District LH, the other poor district, received $10 million of new funds.2 5' LH put over $6 million of its money in a
discretionary program for each school. None of the schools used
these discretionary funds to make substantive changes to their
curricula. 52 Furthermore, none of the districts used the additional revenue to supplement the textbooks that the Texas Education
Agency distributes. 3
The old SB 351 system also failed to promote curriculum
development because it did not require districts to adopt longrange plans for the use of new state aid. In the local district expenditure study, the poor districts that received the greatest
amount of funding invested little of their new aid into programs
requiring continuing funding commitments. Poor districts spent
most of their money on one-time expenditures for facilities instead
of improving core academic programs.' Although buildings and
facilities enable schools to offer programs, they are not, in and of
themselves, elements of a school's core educational agenda. The
SB 7 scheme attempts to rectify this shortcoming by requiring each
school district to create a long-term district curricula improvement
plan 5 This change is beneficial because without any state guidance as to how districts should spend aid or a requirement of
long-range planning, one cannot predict whether in the future a
district will use an aid increase to supplement educational pro-

249.

The districts in the study were identified as HH (high property wealth of

$240,000 per student, high enrollment of nearly 200,000 students), HM (high property
wealth of over $300,000 per pupil, medium enrollment of 7,740 students), LH (low property wealth of $77,031 per student, high enrollment of 50,036 students), and LM (low

property wealth of $40,871 per pupil, medium enrollment of 12,970 students). Picus, supra
note 240, at 394.
250. ld. at 398. LM spent most of its new funding, $8 million, on constructing a new
middle school and upgrading older schools' facilities. Ld. District LM also instituted an

Instructional Monitoring Program that was designed to improve educational personnel's
teaching skills and a parent involvement program. I&a
251. Id
252. Id. at 403.
253. Id. at 399.

254. Id. at 403.
255. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, § 11.252, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2207,
2232-33 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.252).
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grams. However, unlike New Jersey's system, SB 7 does not appear to make districts justify expenditures to the state.
Moreover, despite new long-range planning requirements, poor
districts could refrain from expanding their curricula because of
the Texas schemes' historical lack of funding stability. For example, in May of 1992, former Governor Richards and the legislative
leadership informed schools that there would be no new education
revenue for fiscal year 1992-93.6 A perceived lack of state commitment to funding education would cause districts to refrain from
making educational improvements, such as the creation of new
courses or remedial programs, that would involve long-term
costs.?
Although the SB 7 formula lacks several elements that could
encourage curriculum enrichment, it appropriately provides for extensive accountability mechanisms. For example, districts must
develop end-of-course exams
and publish an annual campus
report card that describes students' performance. 9 In addition,
the Texas Board of Education must adopt a set of academic excellence indicators that measure the quality of learning.2 ° Although
these accountability methods may help districts assess students'
overall achievement, the mechanisms cannot ascertain which additional aid programs effectively enhance students' educations. The
accountability mechanisms also fail to require educational development as a condition to receiving aid. Because the Texas scheme
lacks the requisite state oversight of districts' expenditures, the
revised formula cannot maximize educational improvement in poor
school districts.

256. Picus, supra note 240, at 397.
257. Students in poor districts are not the only ones to suffer under a system without
funding stability. Wealthy districts, which typically have been the most innovative in educational offerings, may make cuts because of instability and decreasing aid receipts. For
example, District HH had to scale back and defer several educational enhancement programs, including a plan to develop partnerships with businesses and other social service

agencies. ld. at 398.
258. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, § 39.023, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 2207,
2370-71 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 39.023).
259. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, §§ 39.051-.053, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2207, 2374-75 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 39.051-.053).
260. Act of May 30, 1995, ch. 260, sec. 1, § 39.051.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 45:397

CONCLUSION

Finance schemes that rely primarily on property taxes to fund
education create wealth-based disparities in educational opportunities. The high courts of Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
Tennessee, and Texas recently have used state constitutional
grounds to invalidate property-tax funding systems. Although legislative responses to these decisions have given poor schools additional funding, the new systems still fail to provide poor schools
with equal access to state aid.
An analysis of revised funding formulas reveals that the most
effective elements in ensuring educational equality are horizontal
equity, vertical equity, and fiscal neutrality. Spending caps are one
way that states have created horizontal equity. For example, within
four years of Kentucky's institution of a spending cap, expenditure
disparities decreased from almost 69% to less than 17%. Similarly,
Texas has progressed towards equalization of school districts' revenues by limiting a school district's taxable property value.
Fiscal neutrality is also a necessary component. Each revised
system appropriately includes fiscal neutrality because the new formulas account for the extra costs of educating special students.
However, none of the states in this study appear to base special
student funding on empirical data that reflect the actual costs of
educating them. Because poor districts typically have the greatest
concentration of special-needs students, the revised funding
schemes continue to leave poor districts short-changed. To be
fiscally neutral, states must account for income differences among
districts when determining how much money a poor district must
raise to qualify for state aid. Systems that have a flat minimum
contribution irrespective of wealth still impermissibly condition aid
on a district's ability to tax.
To enrich the quality of education for poor students, states'
funding schemes must also induce districts to improve and expand
upon their core curricula and implement accountability mechanisms. Empirical evidence illustrates that withholding total local
discretion and creating incentives such as broad-based assessment,
long-range planning requirements, and specific program mandates
successfully encourage curriculum improvement. On the other
hand, experience shows that states that do not implement such
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measures fail to improve the quality of education. To ensure equal
educational opportunity, states must take on a more regulatory
role in education and school districts need to relinquish a degree
of local academic control.

